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THE CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW

PLEADING WRITTEN
INSTRUMENTS IN
CHANCERY BILLS
I.
In General
The growing complexity of the provisions of the modern trust deed, combined with the great number of notes or
bonds with interest coupons thereto attached, often secured by a single trust
deed, makes this subject an important
one to the solicitor who is called on to
foreclose. He must sufficiently plead in
his bill of complaint the written documents on which it is based to secure to
his client the full benefit thereof.
On the other hand, practical considerations, as well as the frequent desirability
of haste in instituting suit, which means
haste in drafting the bill, forbid that he
do more than is necessary from the standpoint of safety. The present day practitioner occupies a far different economic
position as to the disposition of his time
and that of his office assistants than did
his professional forefathers. With this
situation in view, and with special reference to the practice in the State of
Illinois, a common law jurisdiction,
where no statute or local rule of court
applies, this subject is now considered. It
is obvious that there are but four ways
in which documents can be pleaded in
bills in chancery, viz: in haec verba; in
substance only; in substance only with
an exact copy thereof attached to the
bill as an exhibit and thereby made a
part thereof; and in substance only and
by apt reference thereto the document
itself made a part thereof.
II.
In Haec Verba
That the practice in the English courts
of Chancery at an early date was to set
forth all written documents in full where

the same were relied upon and even
probably in instances where the document itself was not material to complainant's case, is evidenced by the rules that
were early adopted to correct this abuse.
The ordinance of Lord Bacon against impertinence was doubtless directed in part
at least against this practice. He declared that both the party and the counsel under whose hand pleading of immoderate length had passed, should be
fined. Lord Keeper Coventry, with the
advice of Sir Julius Caesar, the Master
of the Rolls, in the year A.D. 1635, ordained that bills, answers and other chancery pleadings "should not be stuffed
with the repetitions of deeds or writings
in haec verba, but the effect and substance of so much of them only as was
pertinent and material to be set down,
and that in brief and effectual terms, etc.,
and upon any default therein, the party
and counsel under whose hand it passed,
should pay the charge of the copy and
be further punished as the case should
merit."
The same rule was re-enacted by the
Lords Commissioners in the year A.D.
.1649 and in Lord Clarendon's Digest or
System of Rules (Vane's Orders 2569 and
165) and that these rules were not entirely effective, at least in the American
Colonies we can infer from the fact that
in the year A.D. 1727 the Governor of
the Colony of New York, exercising in
Council the powers of the Court of Chancery, appointed five commissioners as a
committee to consider and report as to
methods of correcting existing abuses in
Courts of Chancery. In their report they
found it necessary to refer to the unfortunate existence of this form of impertinence in Chancery bills filed in the
courts of the Colony. Thereafter, in the
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year 1820, Chancellor Kent in the case of
Hood vs. Inman, 4 Johns Ch. (N. Y.)
437, in referring to the pleading of a
power of attorney in haec verba in the
answer, where the substance of it was
accurately stated in the bill, held it to
be impertinent saying "The objection to
the unnecessary folia may be taken on
the taxation of costs."
There can be no question that, except
in the instance where the document relied upon is very brief and the exact
language thereof of the very gist of the
cause of action itself, the setting forth
of the same in the bill in extenso is not
only an offence against good form in
pleading but such an offence as, on exception, should be held to be impertiThere has been no substantial
nence.
change in the law in American jurisdictions since Chancellor Kent spoke in the
year 1820.

III.
In Substance Only
It is fundamental that the pleader must
set forth in his bill all of the ultimate
material facts which go to constitute his
cause of action and that having done so
he is required to do no more by the general rules of Chancery pleading. This
situation is modified of course in jurisdictions where statutes or local rules of
court provide that written instruments
should be filed with the pleading. As,
for instance, in Art. 16, Par. 120 of the
Code of Maryland which is based upon
the 4th equity rule, it is provided "that
no order for process shall be made or
issued upon any bill, petition or other
paper until such bill, petition or other
paper, together with all the exhibits referred to as parts thereof, be actually
filed with the Clerk of the court. See
Beachey v. Heiple, 130 Md. 683, 101A,
553; Henderson v. Harper, 127 Md. 429,
96 A. 550; Ann, Cas. 1917 C. 93; Peabody
vs. George's Creek Coal, Etc. Co., 120
Md. 659, 87, 1097; Nagan Gast vs. Alz.
93 Md. 522, 49 A. 333; Chappell vs. Clark,
92 Md. 98, 48 A. 36; Baltimore v. Coates,
95 Md. 531, 37 A. 18.

In Tennessee, the rule is the same except that the written documents upon
which complainant's cause af action is
based may be produced on order of the
chancellor after the bill is filed and the
bill itself is not demurrable because the
same are not filed therewith. Carter v.
Chattanooga (Ch. A.T. 48 S.W. 117).
There is much to be said in favor of
this method of pleading because in the
first place it lays no additional burden
upon the pleader. Good form and safety
require that he at least set forth in substance the written document relied upon
in his bill even though he may thereafter
attach the same as an exhibit. The only
danger is one which arises from failure
to completely and accurately allege all
that is material.
IV.
In Haec Verba With Exhibit Attached
This method for many years has been
the common practice in the United States
though there is little evidence that the
same ever became general in England.
There has been, however, some -difference
of opinion as to the relative weight and
consideration to be given to the exhibit
in comparison with that to be attached
to the bill itself. Some authorities have
held that the attaching of the exhibit
does not dispense with the usual allegations as to the substance of the document in the pleading, while others have
held that the attaching of the exhibit
practically excuses the pleader from any
more than formal referene2 to the document in the bill.
Among the courts adhering to the
first view we find again several shades
of opinion, where a variance occurs.
Some jurisdictions hold that the allegations of the bill control, but the majority
hold that in such case the provisions of
the exhibit are controlling.
In Guadaloupe v. Johnston, 1 Tex. Civ.
A. 713 the Court says:
"It is indeed admissible to a certain
extent in pleading in Chancery to file
written evidence as exhibits and to
refer to them as a part of the bill or
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answer but good pleading requires that
everything that is material to the case
should be set forth in the pleading itself by proper averments. This may
be done in general terms and the exhibit may be referred to for greater
certainty as to particular details but
the pleading ought to contain the substance of the case."
In Caton v. Willis, 40 N. C. 336 the
Court says "Exhibits do not make a part
of the bill but are a part of the proof
and cannot aid defective statements in
the bill any more than any other part
of the proof." While there are other
similar decisions notably in Missouri
"Pomeroy v. Fullerton, 113 Mo. 440, 21
S. W. 19; Tesson v. Tesson, 11 Mo. 274,
this is not the general rule.
There are so many statements in the
decisions to the effect that an exhibit
properly attached to a bill in chancery
becomes a part thereof so that a defect
in the allegations of the bill concerning
the substance of the document exhibited
will be cured by the exhibit that no attempt will be made here to quote from
any decisions on this subject other than
those of the State of Illinois.
In Moore v. Tilman, 33 Ill. 357, the
court said in reference to the contention
of the appellant that the execution and
delivery of the 'deed of mortgage relied
upon was not sufficiently alleged in the
bill: "The instrument is referred to as an
exhibit which has the same effect as if
copied at large into the bill. The court
will refer to the exhibit to see if it' sufficiently appears to have been so executed."
In Brunner vs. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 100 Ill. App., 22, the court
said: "We are of the opinion that when
a document is referred to in the bill as an
exhibit and attached thereto, and the
whole bill shows that complainant treats
it as a part thereof, it should also be
treated by the court as a part of the bill,"
citing Daniell's Chy P1. and Prac. 367;
Brown vs. Redwyne, 16 Ga. 67; Howard
Mfg. Co. vs. Waterlock Co., 53 Ga. 689.
That Illinois is one of the states whose
courts regard the exhibit as controlling,

rather than the allegations of the bill,
concerning the document exhibited, is
established by many cases. In Benneson
vs. Savage, 130 Ill. 352, Mr. Justice
Scofield said, "It is objected that the contract described and that described in the
trust deed are not the same, and that,
therefore, the trust deed is not security
for the contract described in the bill. A
copy of the trust deed is made part of
the bill as an exhibit, and it is, therefore,
unimportant, even if it would be conceded that the pleader misconceived its
legal effect, for the instrument itself
being thus before us we will give it that
legal effect to which it is entitled," citing
as authority Allen v. Woodruff, 96 IIl., 11.
To the same effect is National Park
Bank of New York vs. Halle, 31 Il. 17.
For many years cautious pleaders in
this jurisdiction have insisted upon attaching as exhibits to bills filed complete
and accurate copies of written documents
relied upon. The objection to the practice is not that it is unsafe but that it
frequently entails a large amount of
In ,foreclosures of
mn echanical work.
large bond issues this practice may be
quite burdensome.
V.
In Substance Only With Incorporation
By Apt Reference
In England after the adoption of the
ordinances hereinbefore referred to, making it no longer proper or permissible to
set forth written documents in extenso
in pleadings filed in Chancery, the practice developed at an early day of setting
them forth in substance, and by sufficient
reference to the document itselt for purposes of identification, making it in express terms a part of the pleading. 1
Daniell Ch. Br. P. 475.
As early as 1820, in Hood vs. Inman,
supra, Chancellor Kent referred with approval to the report of the special commissioners appearing at the end of Bradford's Edition of the Colony Laws of
New York, in which it is said that it is
sufficient after making a statement of
the substance of certain deeds, in order
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[hat the pleader may have the benefit of
5aid deeds, for him to conclude "as by
the deeds ready to be produced will apDear".
There are other later American authorities to the same effect.
In Sweetland vs. Sweetland, 3 Mich.
482, the Court said:
"By referring in a bill to an instrument 'as in and by said Indenture (reference being thereunto had) when produced will more fully and at large appear' the whole document referred to
is made a part of the record."
They further held that though not fully
nor accurately set forth in the bill complainant might at the hearing avail himself of such portions as are not recited
as well as such portions as are inaccurately set forth.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the
case of Eskridge vs. Brown et al., 208
Ala. 210 (94 So. 353) in commenting on
the situation where the bill recites after
describing the existence of a certain conveyance which is relied upon by the
"Said conveyance is recorded
pleader:
in the office of the Judge of Probate of
Marengo County, Alabama, in D.B.Vol.T.
G.P.253 et. seq., and which conveyance
is hereby referred to and with leave of
court made a part of this bill of complaint the same as though it was here
set forth in full and with leave of reference hereto as often as may be necessary," that the conveyances alleged in
the bill were sufficiently averred. It is
not clear in the foregoing case whether
the court holds the averment of the written document to be sufficient on account
of the allegations as to the substance
thereof found in the bill, or because of
the method of incorporation by reference
thereto which is adopted by the pleader.
A fair inference, however, is that some
weight at least was attached to the document itself on account of its incorporation by reference.
It should be noted in this connection
that the same court in Jones vs. Caraway,
reported in 87 So. 820, which did not set
forth the substance of a mortgage sought

to be declared void by the bill but which
merely stated the book and page in
which same was recorded and said, "To
which reference is hereto made" held
this to be wholly inadequate to make the
mortgage a part of the bill.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina
in Martin v. McBride, 38 N. C. (3 Ir.
Eq.) 531, said that where a bill refers to
an instrument which is relied upon without setting forth the contents thereof, or
having annexed thereto a copy is bad on
demurrer. In this connection it should
be noted, however, that the uniform ruling of this court is that it is necessary,
not only to set forth the written instrument relied upon in substance, but if the
same is material to complainants' cause
of action, to attach also a copy of it to
the bill as an exhibit.
One of the most favorable cases from
the standpoint of this practice is that of
Loewenstein vs. Rapp, 67 I. App. 678.
This was a bill to foreclose a trust deed
upon certain premises in Cook County,
Illinois. The pleader failed to set forth
in his bill any of the provisions of the
trust deed having to do with the payment of the taxes by the legal holder of
the notes secured thereby or the allowance of solicitors' fees in the event of
foreclosure, but the trust deed, although
a copy thereof was not attached to the
bill, was made part of the bill by reference thereto. Mr. Justice Waterman,
in delivering the opinion of the court,
said: "The allegations of the bill regarding the trust deed were sufficient to make
the trust deed a part of the bill. * * *
In stating deeds or other written instruments in a bill, it is usual to refer to the
instrument itself in some such words as
the following, namely: 'as by the said
indenture when produced will appear'.
The effect of such reference is to make
the whole instrument referred to a part
of the record. The effect of referring to
it is to enable the plaintiff to rely upon
every part of the instrument and to prevent his being precluded from availing
himself at the hearing of any portion,
either of its recital or operative part,
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which may not be inserted in the bill.
Thus it seems that a plaintiff may by his
bill state simply the deed and general
purport of any particular deed or instrument under which he claims and that
such instrument, provided it is accompanied by refererice to the deed itself,
It cannot be conwill be sufficient."
tended in the absence of a decision of
the Supreme Court of Illinois, that such
a practice would insure to the pleader all
of the benefits which might accrue to him
in the event that he had attached the
document relied upon to his bill as an exhibit. On the other hand, however, it
does not appear from the authorities that
the practice of incorporating the written
instrument by reference only, after setting forth the substance thereof in the
bill itself, is improper or is not as beneficial to the pleader as the more cumbersome method. The authorities in other
states holding that such a practice is improper, or that exhibits must be attached
to the bill, are for the most part based
upon local statutes or rules of court
which modify the original chancery practice. Such decisions of course are not
controlling in the state of Illinois. There
can be no doubt that if the substance of
the written instrument is properly pleaded
in the bill there can be no necessity in
this state of attaching exhibits. It seems
therefore a reasonable conclusion that
where the bill contains sufficient allegations as to the substance, and where the
documents relied upon are of such
length that their incorporation as exhibits would be onerous, distinct advantage might be attained by making them
a part of the bill by apt reference thereto without attaching copies as exhibits.

College building mufflers and scarfs of
every hue and description, rubbers, some
good, others that have seen their days,
brief-cases, a comb case, books and numerous keys of which there undoubtedly
must be the Seven Keys to Baldpate.
We have Miss Scheiner's word that all
these articles now in the custody of the
College's lost and found department will
be awarded to the plaintiff in each case
if the proper identification of them is
made.

LOST AND FOUND
DEPA RTMENT

THANK YOU
ALUMNI

Miss Scheiner has offered to open a
court of claims in her office to hear the
cases of those students who have lost
various and sundry articles. There have
been left in various places about the

GREETINGS
ALUMNI

Please Return Your
Good Wishes By Sending In The Ballot on
Page 13.

